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Major corporate shareholders fre-
quently invest capital in their corpo-
rate enterprises, and their returns of
this invested capital may not
constitute income under I.R.C.
§ 301(c)(2). Some of these taxpayers
have been known to divert corporate
funds into their personal pockets.
While this may not necessarily con-
stitute a violation of corporate law
precepts, it has harsh, potentially
criminal, income tax implications.
When defending criminal tax eva-
sion charges for diversion of corpo-
rate funds for which individual
income taxes have not been paid, a
taxpayer may attempt to prove that
he had no tax deficiency by assert-
ing that the monies the government
alleges constitute unreported income
in fact simply were nontaxable
returns of capital, whether or not
they originally were intended to be
such. In alignment with the govern-
ing statute, a taxpayer who claims
the nontaxability of such sums will
attempt to demonstrate that the cor-
porate enterprise lacked earnings
and profits, and that the amount of
money diverted was not greater than
the taxpayer's basis in his stock.
This evidence, if presented and
accepted, negates elements of cer-
tain tax-related crimes, thereby
undermining the prosecution.
However, there is a conflict between
the Ninth and Second Circuits (as
well as other Circuits) concerning
the ease with which a taxpayer may
introduce return of capital evidence.
The Ninth Circuit, in United States
v. Miller, 545 F.2d 1204 (9th Cir.
1976), restrictively ruled that, in
the criminal context, a taxpayer
must first show, contemporaneous
with the distribution, an intent that
the payment is a return of capital
before he will be permitted to intro-
duce return of capital evidence and
speak to the principles set forth in
I.R.C. §§ 301 and 316. On the other
hand, the Second Circuit, in United
States v. Bok, 156 F.3d 157 (2nd
Cir. 1998), and United States v.
D'Agostino, 145 F.3d 69 (2nd Cir.
1998), determined that there is no
contemporaneous intent require-
ment, and that a taxpayer defending
criminal charges has the same abili-
ty as a taxpayer contesting a civil
tax matter to present return of
capital evidence.
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ISSUE
The issue identified by the U.S.
Supreme Court in granting the writ
of certiorari in this case, see, 128 S.
Ct. 32, is: "Whether the diversion of
corporate funds to a shareholder of
a corporation without earnings and
profits automatically qualifies as a
non-taxable return of capital up to
the shareholder's stock basis, see 26
U.S.C. § 301(c)(2) even if the diver-
sion was not intended as a return of
capital."
FACTS
Petitioner Michael Boulware owned
at least half the stock, and was
founder, chairman, and president, of
Hawaiian Isles Enterprises (HIE), a
company that sells coffee, water,
and other items. The government
charged him with multiple counts of
willfully filing false tax returns and
willfully attempting to evade tax,
and one count of conspiring to
make a false statement to a federally
insured financial institution, claim-
ing that he failed to report approxi-
mately $10 million in income that
he allegedly diverted from HIE in a
variety of ways. Boulware was con-
victed on all counts after a trial in
district court, but the Ninth Circuit,
while affirming the conspiracy con-
viction, reversed the tax-related
convictions on grounds that certain
evidence relating to a state court
judgment in an action brought by
his girlfriend to determine the own-
ership of funds had been improperly
excluded. The Ninth Circuit then
remanded the case for a new trial.
United States v. Boulware, 384 F.3d
794 (9th Cir. 2003).
At his new district court trial,
Boulware adopted the following
strategy: he attempted to present
evidence, and requested that the
jury be instructed, that the money
he received from HIE represented
nontaxable returns of capital he had
invested in the company. The gov-
ernment sought to limit Boulware's
proposed evidentiary presentation
on grounds that Miller requires that
a taxpayer first show that the dis-
puted distributions were contempo-
raneously intended to be a return of
capital before the rules pertaining to
these distributions will apply in a
criminal tax proceeding. The dis-
trict court agreed, stating that when
offering "return of capital" evidence,
Boulware cannot merely contend
that the monies could have consti-
tuted a return of capital-instead,
he must show that the funds in fact
were a return of capital. Because
Boulware was unable to meet this
foundational standard-he could not
demonstrate that the funds in fact
were a return of capital-the district
court refused to admit this evidence
and declined to instruct the jury as
requested.
Boulware again was convicted on
the tax counts and sentenced to
imprisonment, and his conviction
and sentence were affirmed on
appeal. Boulware v. United States,
470 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2006). On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected
Boulware's claim that the district
court misread the holding in Miller,
stating that it "disagree[d] that any
part of Miller's reasoning can be dis-
regarded." Accordingly, the appeals
court confirmed that the manner in
which diverted funds may be char-
acterized for civil tax purposes is
not controlling in the context of
criminal proceedings, and that "the
appropriate characterization for
criminal purposes is whether the
defendant has willfully attempted to
evade the payment or assessment of
a tax," a question that is not
resolved by simply showing that the
event would be nontaxable had the
taxpayer followed a different path.
And, in response to Boulware's con-
tention that imposition of a require-
ment that the taxpayer show that he
intended a return of capital uncon-
stitutionally shifted the burden of
proof to the taxpayer, the court stat-
ed that once the government has
shown that the taxpayer diverted
funds from the corporation and
failed to pay taxes on the diverted
funds, the burden of proof lawfully
shifts to the taxpayer to show that
the funds reflected a return of capi-
tal. Because Boulware did not show
that the diverted funds were intend-
ed to be a return of capital at the
time they were taken, he failed to
lay an adequate foundation for his
defense, and the district court prop-
erly rejected it.
The United States Supreme Court
granted a writ of certiorari to review
the decision of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. Boulware v.
United States, 128 S. Ct. 32 (2007).
As previously noted, the Court's
order granting the writ specified the
question to be addressed by the par-
ties as: "Whether the diversion of
corporate funds to a shareholder of
a corporation without earnings and
profits automatically qualifies as a
non-taxable return of capital up to
the shareholder's stock basis, see 26
U.S.C. § 301(c)(2) even if the diver-
sion was not intended as a return of
capital."
CASE ANALYSIS
In considering the Boulware case,
a review of the contrary decisions
of the Second Circuit is helpful.
The first Second Circuit case,
D'Agostino, involved a couple who
owned a business and were convict-
ed of multiple counts of tax evasion
and attempted tax evasion.
Testimony at their district court tri-
al revealed that, over time, they had
diverted corporate funds for person-
al use, and that the couple had not
reported this income on their indi-
vidual income tax returns. Their
accountants testified that the corpo-
ration had made significant loans to
them, and that the couple had
invested substantial capital in the
(Continued on Page 158)
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entity. That the corporation had no
earnings and profits during the tax
years in issue was undisputed. The
district court instructed the jury
that if it found beyond a reasonable
doubt that the taxpayers did not
intend the funds to be a return of
capital at the time of the distribu-
tion, then the monies would consti-
tute taxable income. The couple was
convicted on all accounts, and
appealed to the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals.
In considering whether the govern-
ment had met its burden of proving
that the D'Agostinos were personally
liable for unpaid income taxes vis-A-
vis the corporate distribution, the
Second Circuit, citing three previ-
ous cases and an IRS Action on
Decision involving both civil and
criminal matters, noted that "[iun
this Circuit, corporate funds lawful-
ly diverted by a shareholder consti-
tute taxable income only to the
extent that the corporation had
earnings and profits during the tax
year in which the diversion
occurred." 145 F.3d at 72. The court
noted the existence of an Eleventh
Circuit case to the contrary, United
States v. Williams, 875 F.2d 846
(11th Cir. 1989), which the govern-
ment urged it to adopt, but declined
to circumvent binding precedent
within the circuit. Further, the
court found the rule of its own
Circuit to be "better reasoned."
According to the court, "[tihe
Williams rule purports to minimize
the government's burden of proving
a tax deficit and places greater
emphasis on the intent element in
criminal tax evasion cases. The
apparent result, however, is that the
government bears a higher burden
of proof in a civil tax collection mat-
ter than in a criminal tax evasion
prosecution. In addition, the
approach taken in Williams and
Davis [Davis v. United States, 226
F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1955)] effectively
eliminates proof of a tax deficiency
as an element of a 26 U.S.C. § 7201
violation. Under the Williams rule,
the government would only need to
prove that the taxpayer willfully
intended to exercise domain and
control over the diverted funds and
took affirmative acts to evade pay-
ing taxes. If Congress intended this
showing to suffice to establish a vio-
lation of § 7201, it would not have
included a tax deficit as a requisite
element." On this basis, the court
reversed the D'Agostinos' convic-
tions and remanded the case to the
district court with a direction that
the judgments be vacated and the
indictments dismissed.
The other pertinent Second Circuit
case, United States v. Bok, 156 F.3d
157 (2nd Cir. 1998), involved the
president and sole shareholder of a
construction company who was
indicted, tried, and convicted for tax
evasion and making false statements
on an income tax return on account
of his appropriation of corporate
funds for personal use. At Bok's dis-
trict court trial, the judge refused to
instruct the jury that the money he
diverted from the corporation may
have been a nontaxable return of
capital. The Second Circuit affirmed
Bok's convictions, but not on
grounds that it is never appropriate
to so instruct the jury in criminal
cases. To the contrary, the court
provided a thorough exposition of a
taxpayer's ability to maintain a
return of capital defense, and con-
firmed that the defense has equal
application in civil and criminal cas-
es. The court further instructed that
"a taxpayer's intent is not determi-
native in defining the taxpayer's
conduct. That is, the taxpayer or the
corporation need not have described
the distribution at issue as a divi-
dend or a return of capital at the
time it was made; rather, the reali-
ties of the transaction-including
the amount of the shareholder's
basis and the corporation's earnings
or profits, as well as the amount of
the distribution-govern its charac-
terization for tax purposes."
In his Supreme Court brief,
Boulware asserts that the Miller
contemporaneous intent require-
ment has no basis in the governing
statute, and that all a criminal
defendant need show to put on his
return of capital defense is that the
corporation was without earnings
and profits and that the distribution
did not exceed his stock basis for
the year in issue. He also maintains
that I.R.C. § 301 applies to both civ-
il and criminal tax cases, and that
Miller's analysis of the return of
capital doctrine is wrong for three
reasons: (1) citing D'Agostino,
Boulware contends that it elimi-
nates proof of a tax deficiency as an
element of criminal tax evasion; (2)
it creates an anomalous situation, in
that a taxpayer may incur no civil
liability under a return of capital
analysis, but yet, based upon the
same distribution, may be subjected
to criminal liability; and (3) as pre-
viously stated, there is no statutory
foundation for imposition of a con-
temporaneous intent requirement.
Boulware takes issue with the gov-
ernment's assertion in opposing his
application for a writ of certiorari
that the phrase "with respect to its
stock" set forth in I.R.C. § 301(a)
supports Miller's imposition of a
contemporaneous intent require-
ment. According to Boulware, this
phrase simply distinguishes money
the taxpayer receives in his capacity
as a corporate shareholder from
money he receives in other capaci-
ties, and does not give rise to an
intent requirement. Finally,
Boulware submits that even if the
Supreme Court determines that
some forms of unlawful diversion
are not within I.R.C. §§ 301 and
316, he is still entitled to reversal
and remand for a new trial, for the
reason that the government must
still prove the unlawfulness of the
diversion to a jury.
Issue No. 4 Volume 35
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To the contrary, the United States in
its brief asks the Supreme Court to
hold that a taxpayer who has divert-
ed funds from a corporation without
earnings and profits is not automati-
cally entitled to assert a return of
capital defense because such a hold-
ing is not in line with the language
of I.R.C. § 301, and opens the door
to tax fraud. Under the precise lan-
guage of § 301, the distribution to
the taxpayer must have been a pay-
ment to the shareholder in his
shareholder capacity, and there is
no default rule that any distribution
made to the shareholder automati-
cally qualifies as such. Accordingly,
before a taxpayer can avail himself
of a nontaxable return of capital
defense, he must show that the
diverted funds were intended to be
a distribution to him in his share-
holder capacity.
The government also asserts that
acceptance of Boulware's argument
concerning automatic treatment of
diverted funds as a return of capital
would subvert the congressional
purpose to impose income tax on
lawful, as well as unlawful, gains and
would have the effect of endorsing
the diversion of corporate funds to
personal use without income tax
consequences. Further, the govern-
ment does not see that an inconsis-
tency exists between civil and crim-
inal tax cases as concerns the
return of capital defense-according
to the government, there is no auto-
matic rule in either context, and it
is critical in both instances that the
property distribution must have
been made by a corporation to a
shareholder with respect to the
shareholder's stock. The govern-
ment also disputes Boulware's claim
that the Ninth Circuit's decision
reduces the prosecution's burden of
proof, stating that the real issue lies
with the legitimacy of the return of
capital defense, not with which par-
ty has the burdens of proof and pro-
duction. Finally, the government
advised the Court that Boulware's
convictions should be affirmed-
even if the only elements of a return
of capital defense are that the cor-
poration had no earnings and profits
and that the diverted funds did not
exceed the shareholder's basis-
because his diversion was an
unlawful one, and therefore, the
return of capital defense is inapplic-
able, as even D'Agostino and Bok
acknowledge.
SIGNIFICANCE
While the core issue to be addressed
case does not have widespread sig-
nificance to the general taxpaying
public, it does have direct perti-
nence to criminal tax evasion cases
involving significant corporate
shareholders prosecuted for diver-
sion of corporate funds for personal
use and nonpayment of income tax-
es on those sums. A decision in
favor of the taxpayer will seriously
impair the ability of the prosecution
in these types of cases to show that
the diverted sums create a tax defi-
ciency. On the other hand, a deci-
sion in favor of the government will
greatly advance its ability to convict
persons whose actions in diverting
funds and failing to pay income tax-
es on those sums have been sub-
stantially less than forthright.
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